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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) consist of small sensor nodes which operate until 
their energy reserve is depleted. These nodes are generally deployed to the environments 
where network lifespan is much longer than the lifetime of a node. Therefore, WSN are 
typically operated in a multiphase fashion, where new nodes are periodically deployed to 
the environment to ensure constant local and global network connectivity. Besides, 
significant amount of the research in the literature studies only static WSN and there is 
very limited work considering mobility of the sensor nodes. 
In this thesis, we present a key predistribution scheme for mobile and multiphase 
WSN which is resilient against eager and temporary node capture attacks. In our Hash 
Graph based (HaG) scheme, every generation has its own key pool which is generated 
using the key pool of the previous generation. This allows nodes deployed at different 
generations to have the ability to establish secure channels. Likewise, a captured node 
can only be used to obtain keys for a limited amount of successive generations. We also 
consider sensor nodes as mobile and use different mobility models to show its effects on 
the performance. We compare the connectivity and resiliency performance of our 
scheme with a well-known multiphase key predistribution scheme and show that our 
scheme performs better when the attack rate is low. When the attack rate increases, our 
scheme still has better resiliency performance considering that it requires less key ring 
size compared to a state-of-the-art multiphase scheme. 
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ÇOK FAZLI VE MOBİL KABLOSUZ DUYARGA AĞLARI İÇİN TASARLANMIŞ 
ÖZET ÇİZGESİ TABANLI ÖNYÜKLEMELİ ANAHTAR DAĞITIM ŞEMASI 
Salim Sarımurat 
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2013 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Anahtar Ön Dağıtımı, Güvenlik, Çok Fazlı Kablosuz Duyarga 
Ağları, Mobil Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları 
Özet 
Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları (KDA), duyarga düğümü adı verilen ve enerji kaynakları 
kısıtlı olan küçük aygıtlardan oluşur. Bu düğümler genellikle ağ ömrünün duyarga 
düğümünün pil ömründen çok daha fazla olduğu ortamlarda konuşlandırılırlar. 
Dolayısıyla KDA’lar yerel ve genel bağlantı oranlarını sabit bir değerde tutmak için 
ortama sürekli yeni düğümlerin konuşlandırıldığı çok fazlı bir biçimde çalışmaktadırlar. 
Bunun yanısıra, literatürdeki araştırmaların önemli bir kısmı statik KDAlar üzerine 
yapılan çalışmaları içerirken, duyarga düğümlerinin mobil olması durumunu 
değerlendiren çok kısıtlı çalışma bulunmaktadır. 
Bu tezde, mobil ve çok fazlı KDAlarda kullanılmak üzere tasarlanmış, sürekli ve 
geçici düğüm ele geçirme saldırılarına karşı dayanıklı bir anahtar ön dağıtım şeması 
sunulmaktadır. Önerilen Özet Çizgesi Tabanlı (ÖÇT) şemada, bütün nesillerin 
kendilerine ait bir anahtar havuzu bulunmaktadır. Bu havuzlar önceki neslin anahtar 
havuzu kullanılarak üretilmekte, ve bu sayede farklı nesillerde konuşlandırılan düğümler 
birbirleriyle iletişim kurma imkanı bulmaktadırlar. Ayrıca, ele geçirilen bir düğüm 
sadece kısıtlı bir sayıdaki ardışık nesillerin anahtar havuzlarından ufak bir miktarda 
anahtarı ifşa etmektedir. Önerilen şema ile iyi bilinen bir şema arasında karşılaştırmalı 
analizler gerçekleştirilmiş ve saldırı oranı düşük olduğu durumda önerilen şemanın çok 
daha iyi dayanıklılık performansı sergilendiği gözlemlenmiştir. Saldırı oranı 
artırıldığında da, karşılaştırılan şemadan daha az anahtar kullanarak aynı yerel bağlantı 
oranı yakalandığı gözlenmiş ve yine daha iyi oranda dayanıklılık performansı 
görülmüştür. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are composed of sensor nodes which have limited 
amount of memory, energy and computation power. In typical application settings, 
sensor nodes are spread randomly over an environment and collect data that is 
transferred to a trusted central point for further examination [4]. Most of these 
application scenarios require long term sensing of the environment and energy reserve of 
the sensor nodes last for a very limited time. Therefore, deploying new nodes to the 
environment in certain intervals, called generations, is the only way to have stable 
network connectivity. Since the network lifespan is much longer than the lifetime of a 
sensor node, it is most likely that we have multiple generations while sensing an 
environment. Networks that provide this property are called Multiphase WSN.  
Security of the communication between sensor nodes becomes an important criterion 
when WSNs are deployed in hostile environments. Wireless nature of the 
communication has both advantages and disadvantages on the network. A sensor node 
can easily create communication links with its neighboring nodes, however this link can 
be intercepted by an intruder and the transferred information can be eavesdropped by 
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means of third party attackers. One other security risk is that these nodes are often 
deployed unattended. They are left to the environment and not checked for a long time. 
Therefore, they are open to physical attacks as well. These security problems and some 
other ones are addressed in [11] and many researchers have studied security related 
issues in relation to WSN deployments. 
These security problems encountered in WSN are addressed by applying cryptographic 
primitives on the data that is transferred over the communication link. As we have 
pointed before, sensor nodes have limited resources; therefore, it is not possible to use 
cryptographic mechanisms requiring high computational power, such as public key 
cryptography. Instead, symmetric key cryptography approaches are employed in WSN to 
provide security. Symmetric key cryptography is more CPU-efficient and does not 
require high amount of computational power and energy. However, sensor nodes collect 
excesive amount of data and it is not feasible to transfer this data to the base station one 
at a time. As an alternative, sensor nodes should have the capability to process the data 
before transferring it to the base station. When a sensor node receives some encrypted 
information from its neighbor, it should be able to see the data and fuse it with its own 
collected information before transferring it to other nodes. This entails that the keys need 
to be shared among the sensor nodes. In other words, secure communication between 
WSN nodes should be possible. 
There exists many different key agreement protocol proposals for WSNs and we can 
organize them in three groups: (i) trusted server approaches, (ii) public key cryptography 
based mechanisms and (iii) key predistribution schemes. Among these, key 
predistribution approach is the most viable method for WSNs [11]. In key predistribution 
schemes, keys are distributed to all sensor nodes prior to deployment and nodes use these 
keys to create secure communication links. There exist various solutions in this category 
such as single master key, full pairwise [5], probabilistic [5, 6] and deterministic [7, 8, 
12] approaches. These key predistribution schemes try to balance the two important 
metrics for sensor networks: network connectivity and resiliency against node capture 
attacks.  
In some application scenarios, WSNs should be considered as mobile and sensor nodes 
should be able to adapt to rapid changes in the network. Introducing mobility to sensor 
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nodes in WSN can enhance its capability and flexibility to support multiple missions and 
handle many of the problems mentioned before. Sensors can be attached to people for 
health monitoring, which may take account of the heart rate, blood pressure etc. 
However, most of the key predistribution schemes in the literature are proposed for static 
and single phase WSN. There exist a handful of research efforts for mobile WSNs [14, 
18-21] but none of them considers a multiphase network.  
 
1.1. Our Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis 
In the literature, most of the proposed key predistribution schemes are designed for 
single phase WSN and ignore the fact that sensor nodes have very limited amount of 
battery power. Since the battery of sensor nodes deplete in a very short time, deploying 
new sensor nodes to the environment in multiphase fashion is essential in maintaining 
long term surveillance. One other problem of the single phase WSN solutions is node 
additions to the network. Although they allow node additions to the network when the 
deployed sensor nodes die, this operation is not stress-free and secure. Modification of 
single phase WSN key predistribution solutions to adapt multiphase WSN has the 
weakness of continuous usage of the same list of keys for multiple generations. Keys 
captured by an attacker at any time can be used in the course of the network’s operation 
time. However, with multiphase WSN, we can use different generation key lists that are 
completely different from the key lists used in other generations. This way, an attacker 
would only be able to compromise some portion of the network and after some time, the 
percentage of the compromised nodes will become stable if the attack is permanent. To 
the best of our knowledge, there are only a few key predistribution schemes [1-4, 9-10] 
addressing multiple deployments of the sensor nodes, which is called multiphase WSN. 
One other thing about the WSN deployments is that sensor nodes are often perceived 
as static. There is very limited work that considers sensor nodes as mobile [14]. 
However, it is very likely that these nodes will be deployed to the environments where 
natural effects will cause them to move from one location to the other. Therefore, key 
predistribution schemes should also consider the mobility of the WSN [14]. There exist 
several entity and group mobility models for sensor networks and they are categorized as 
entity and group mobility models. Entity mobility models consider each sensor node 
4 
 
individually, whereas group mobility models form sets of nodes [13]. In our study, we 
have used Random Walk Mobility model as entity model and Reference Point Group 
Mobility model as the group mobility model. We have also used Circular Move Mobility 
model, which is in between entity and group mobility models, because it considers each 
sensor node independently but the nature of the environment forces nodes to move in 
groups. Circular Move Mobility model is an environmentally friendly hybrid mobility 
model that is first proposed by our research group and we describe its model in detail. 
In this thesis, we present a new key predistribution scheme which is based on hash 
graphs of keys and it provides better secure connectivity between sensor nodes deployed 
at different generations. In our Hash Graph based (HaG) scheme, each deployment 
generation has its own key pool and these pools are generated using the pool of the 
previous generation. Key pool of the first generation is randomly generated and the 
subsequent generations use two consecutive keys of the preceding generation to form a 
key for the next generation. More specifically, two sequential keys are XORed (i.e. 
logical Exclusive Disjunction operation) and hashed together using a secure hash 
function to constitute a key of the next generation key pool. When two nodes are in the 
communication range, they use the generation that they have been deployed to the 
network in conjunction with the identification numbers to decide whether they have a 
common key or not. If they can find at least one common key, then nodes perform XOR 
operation on all common keys to generate a direct link key that is used for secure 
communication. With the HaG scheme, a temporary attacker can only compromise some 
portion of the network and right after the attack stops, scheme self-heals the keys until 
the compromised key ratio decreases to zero. Similarly, an eager attacker is only able to 
compromise some steady fraction of the network. Attack models and network resiliency 
metrics are described in performance evaluation section. Compared to other multiphase 
schemes, HaG scheme provides better in resiliency if the attack rate is low. If the attack 
rate is high, we have some considerable improvements on the resiliency as well. Using a 
smaller amount of keys, HaG scheme delivers same connectivity rate with better 
resiliency performance. 
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1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes existing key 
predistribution methods and gives background information about the mobility models. In 
Chapter 3, we provide detailed information about the scheme that we propose. Chapter 4 
discusses the comparative performance analysis of our scheme and RoK scheme. Finally 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background Information 
 
In this section, we give background information on Wireless Sensor Networks and 
describe their security requirements. Then we summarize previously proposed key 
predistribution schemes that provide these requirements. We also give details of the 
mobility models that we have used to evaluate the performance of our proposal. 
 
2.1. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of small devices which are deployed to 
different environments in large numbers [4]. These devices, called sensor nodes, are 
very small with limited memory, battery power, bandwidth, transmission range, and 
computational power. A WSN is distributed to an environment without any prior 
knowledge of the network topology. Sensor nodes, once deployed, search for their 
neighboring nodes and try to transmit the gathered information to some limited amount 
of Base Stations (BS) available in the network. These BS collect all the information 
from the network for further analysis. 
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Sensor nodes have a wide variety of applications in both military and civilian areas. 
They are being used to collect many type of information from different of environments, 
such as magnetic, acoustic, temperature, seismic etc. Nevertheless, data in the sensor 
nodes deployed in military, health care, or some commercial applications need to be 
securely transmitted. The interception of such data can cause bad circumstances and 
therefore it must be prevented by taking some actions. Wireless nature of the 
communication, resource limitation on sensor nodes, very large and dense deployments, 
lack of fixed infrastructure, unknown network topology before deployment, and high risk 
of physical attacks to unattended sensor nodes are just a few challenges to the security of 
WSNs [4, 22-23].  
 
2.2. Security Requirements of Wireless Sensor Networks 
For security reasons, cryptographic keys must be stored in sensor nodes and they 
should have the ability to carry out secure communication. Therefore key management 
becomes an important problem in WSNs. The key establishment techniques must 
incorporate the following properties [15-17]: 
 Availability: Guaranteeing that the service offered by the whole WSNs is 
available whenever required. 
 Authenticity: Ability to verify that the message sent by a node is authentic. 
 Confidentiality: The key establishment method should safeguard the disclosure of 
any data from the network to any unauthorized third party. 
 Flexibility: Key establishment method should allow adding new nodes at any time 
and it should be useful in multiple applications. 
 Scalability: Key establishment method should allow for the variations in the 
network size. 
 Integrity: Ensuring that the data transmitted by any node is not modified by any 
unauthorized third party. 
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 Non-repudiation: Ability to prevent malicious nodes from hiding their activities. 
 Time Synchronization: Ability to synchronize time between different sensor 
nodes.  
Similarly, security protocols for WSNs have the following constraints and 
requirements. These issues should be kept in mind while designing a new key 
establishment protocol [17]: 
 Memory: Number of keys required for secure communication in the network 
should be as small as possible. 
 Computational power: Computational overhead of the key establishment process 
should be as low as possible. 
 Scalability: It should be possible to add new nodes to the network as needed. 
 Communication power: Key establishment process should limit the amount of 
broadcast information. 
 Secure communication: Probability that two neighboring sensor nodes share some 
common key for secure communication must be high. 
 Resiliency: When a node is captured by an attacker, the impact of this 
compromised node on the rest of the network should be as low as possible. 
 
2.3. Hash Functions 
In order to provide the security of the keys in our key predistribution proposal, we use 
cryptographic mechanism called hash functions. Hash functions are basic components of 
many cryptographic algorithms and they can be used to make many algorithms more 
efficient. In this section, we discuss the basic properties of secure hash functions. 
However, these hash functions should bear some security properties.  
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A secure cryptographic hash function,  , takes an input message of arbitrary length 
and produces an output message digest of fixed length. More formally, a hash function 
can be defined as: 
   ( )   {   }  {   }  
where  is the input message of arbitrary length and   is the output message digest of 
length  . 
Secure hash functions must have the following special characteristics: 
i. Computability: Given a message  , it should be very easy and fast to 
calculate the message digest    ( ). 
ii. One Way Property: Given a hash    ( ), it is computationally infeasible 
to find the message . 
iii. Weak Collision Resistance: Given a hash  , it is computationally infeasible to 
find a message   , such that    (  ). Note that we are not trying to find 
the exact message that has the hash value  . Instead, this property indicates 
that finding some message   , which has the same hash    (  ) value, 
should be hard. 
iv. Strong Collision Resistance: Given a message  , it is computationally 
infeasible to find another message  , such that  ( )   (  ). 
It is clear from the formal description that the set of possible input messages is much 
larger than the set of possible message digests. Therefore, there should always be many 
examples of messages    and    with  (  )   (  ). Requirement iv. says that it 
should be hard to find these examples, but it does not claim that it should be impossible 
to find another message with the same message digest value. 
In our key predistribution scheme, we are using a hash functions to calculate keys 
using a set of other keys. There are many secure hash functions available in the 
literature, such as MD5 [26], SHA-1 [24] and SHA-2 [25]. MD5 algorithm is no longer 
secure; therefore, SHA-1 is preferred in this work. 
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2.4. Key Predistribution Schemes 
Depending on the application area of the WSN, security of the communication 
becomes an important criterion. Different key agreement protocols have been suggested 
for WSNs and we can organize them in three groups: trusted server, public key and key 
predistribution. It has been discussed by different researchers and shown that out of 
these three suggestions, key predistribution approach is the most suitable method for 
WSNs [4-6, 11-12, and 28-32]. In key predistribution schemes, keys are distributed to 
all sensor nodes prior to deployment and nodes use these keys to create secure 
communication links. There exist various solutions to the key predistribution problem, 
such as single master key, full pairwise [5], probabilistic [5, 6] and deterministic [7, 8, 
12] approaches.  
In single master key approach, a master key is predistributed to all nodes and used all 
the time. Though this method is simple and has perfect connectivity between nodes, it 
has very bad network resilience. Once the attacker captures this key, the security of the 
entire network becomes compromised. Full pairwise scheme proposed by Chan et al. 
loads     pairwise keys to every node of the   nodes in the network [5]. Although this 
scheme provides high level of security, it requires high amount of memory on the sensor 
nodes to store pairwise keys. Besides, addition of new nodes to the network is only 
possible if pairwise keys of them are preloaded to the nodes that are deployed before. 
Therefore, these naive approaches are not suitable for WSNs security. 
In probabilistic schemes, nodes receive a group of randomly selected keys, amount of 
which is enough for having a good connectivity percentage over the network. Although 
probabilistic schemes are less secure compared to the full pairwise scheme, they 
circumvent the memory overhead and require nodes to store only some predefined 
amount of keys in their memory. Practically all of the probabilistic schemes have three 
stages: ( ) key predistribution, (  )shared key discovery and (   ) path key 
establishment. Eschenauer and Gligor’s well-known Basic Scheme [6] is one example 
for the probabilistic schemes. In key predistribution phase, each sensor node is loaded 
with   keys that are randomly selected from a key pool of size   where    . After 
deployment, sensor nodes try to discover their neighbors. When two neighboring nodes 
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find at least one common key, then they can create a direct link to communicate 
securely. If no common key exists, then nodes start the path key establishment phase 
and they try to create a direct link with the help of their common neighbors. When we 
evaluate the performance of the Basic scheme, since    , majority of the keys will be 
loaded on multiple nodes and this decreases the resiliency. Finding neighbors with 
common keys, called local connectivity, is also an important performance criterion. 
Therefore, the value of   should be selected wisely to balance resiliency and local 
connectivity. Considering this weakness of the Basic Scheme, Chan et al. [5] have 
proposed a modification on the Basic Scheme, known as q-Composite Scheme, which 
requires two nodes to have at least       keys in common in order to establish a secure 
direct link. This improvement increases the resiliency of the scheme, but decreases the 
connectivity of the network. 
In the literature, we also have deterministic key predistribution approaches which are 
developed from the idea of Blom [7]. Generating one public and one private matrices 
and storing only     keys from these matrices allow the nodes to generate a secure 
direct key with any of the nodes in the network.  However, compromising more than   
nodes in the network will compromise all of the keys used in the network. Du et al. [8] 
propose a combination of the Basic Scheme [6] and Blom’s Scheme [7] without 
increasing   value. This Multiple Space Key Predistribution scheme provides very good 
resilience but it has higher memory requirement and communication overhead. 
One other deterministic approach is proposed by Camtepe and Yener (C-Y scheme) 
[12] and they are the first to apply combinatorial design to key predistribution problem. 
They have presented two different combinatorial designs: symmetric balanced 
incomplete block designs and generalized quadrangles. Their design includes points and 
blocks as distinct key identifiers and nodes. Although they have increased connectivity 
of the network compared to other schemes, their proposal is limited in network size and 
resiliency measures. 
Up to now, all discussed key predistribution schemes are intended for single phase 
WSN. Even though they allow node additions to the network, it is not a stress-free and 
secure operation. Furthermore, modification of single phase WSN key predistribution 
12 
 
solutions to adapt multiphase network has the weakness of continuous usage of the 
same key pool for multiple generations. Keys captured by an attacker at any time can be 
used in the course of the network’s operation time. However, with multiphase WSN, we 
can use different generation pools that are completely different from the key pools used 
in other generations. This way, an attacker would only be able to compromise some 
portion of the network and after some time, the percentage of the compromised nodes 
will become stable if the attack is permanent. To the best of our knowledge, there are 
only a few key predistribution schemes addressing multiple deployments of the sensor 
nodes, i.e. multiphase WSN [1-4, 9-10]. 
Robust Key predistribution (RoK) scheme is proposed by Castelluccia et al. [1] for 
multiphase WSN. This scheme increases the network resiliency increases without 
reducing secure connectivity. The RoK scheme improves the security by limiting the 
lifetime of the key pools and by refreshing the keys in time. RoK has forward and 
backward key pools for each generation; referred as     and     respectively. Keys in 
these pools are randomly generated and they are updated in forward and backward orders 
by hashing.  
We know describe the key establishment process of RoK scheme and the symbols we 
use are listed in Table I below. 
Table 1 - List of symbols used in RoK scheme 
Symbol Definition 
  Key pool size 
     Forward key pool at generation   
     Backward key pool at generation   
    
 
 Forward key ring of node   at generation   
    
 
 Backward key ring of node   at generation   
   
 
 Forward key with index   at generation   
   
 
 Backward key with index   at generation   
   
 
 Key group with index   at generation   
    
 
 Direct link key between nodes   and   for generation   
 ( ) 
Secure hash function 
   {   }  {   }    
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To put it in more concrete terms for comparison with our proposal, forward and 
backward key pools of the RoK scheme at generation   is denoted as follows: 
     {   
     
     
         
 }, (1) 
     {   
     
     
         
 }, (2) 
where P is the key pool size, as it is given in Table 1 below. 
Then forward and backward key pool at the next generation     is defined as 
follows: 
       {   
       
       
           
   } (3) 
       {   
       
       
           
   } (4) 
Although they look similar in formulation, there is an important difference between 
the keys in these pools. Forward keys in the generation    are generated by just 
performing a simple hash operation over the keys in the previous generation. However, 
backward keys in the generation    are used to generate the keys in the generation   by 
performing the same hash operation. These operations are denoted as follows: 
   
     (   
 ) (5) 
   
   (   
   ) (6) 
Nodes are loaded with equal number of keys having the same key identifier from 
forward and backward key pools. Lifetime of node is constrained by      generations 
where   is the deployment generation of the node and    is the generation window. A 
node can only produce forward keys for generation j where    , and backward keys for 
generation   where         . Therefore, a node A deployed at generation   will 
carry two key rings: forward and backward key rings. The forward key ring     
 
 
contains randomly selected forward keys from     . Similarly, the backward key ring 
    
 
 contains randomly selected backward keys from          . Key ring of the 
node A is defined as    
  (    
       
  ) and these key rings are denoted as follows: 
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  {   
     (   |   | )              }                          (7) 
    
  {   
          (   |   | )              }                      (8) 
As it can be observed from these key rings, node A can only update its key ring    
  
for the generation   between   and     . Here, we shall assume that there is a second 
node B and both nodes have common key indexes of           . This means that they 
can compute all the forward keys {   
                               } and 
all backward keys {   
                               }. Therefore, node A 
and B can compute the following secret key and use it to encrypt the communication link 
between them: 
      (    
       
            
       
                
       
      )              (9) 
When two nodes are in communication range, they exchange their generation number 
and node identifier. Using these values, they calculate the identifier of the keys that are 
loaded on the node to be communicated and if they find at least one match, then they 
create the session key and start the secure communication. When an attacker captures a 
node from generation  , he would only be able to compromise keys that are used between 
generations ]      [ because of the generation window boundary. Therefore, attacker 
should be continuously capturing at some rate permanently to have some portion of the 
network compromised. In the formulation (9), forward keys provide forward secrecy, 
meaning attacker will not be able to learn previous keys even if it learns a forward key 
from this list. Similarly, backward keys provide backward secrecy and the attacker will 
not be able to learn any future keys between nodes. Even though the attacker 
permanently captures nodes, he would only be able to compromise some portion of the 
network and as soon as he stops the captures, this percentage will start decreasing and 
become zero after some time. However, RoK scheme requires number of generations to 
be determined before starting the network because of the offline backward key pool 
generation phase. Also, sensor nodes use high computational power to update forward 
keys at every generation time. 
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Random Generation Material (RGM) scheme [2-3] is another multiphase WSN key 
predistribution method proposal. RGM scheme has one key pool for every generation 
and there is no relation between key pools of different generations. Nodes are loaded 
with keys from their deployment generation key pool. Communication between nodes 
deployed at different generations is provided with keys that are generated by XORing the 
keys between the generations of these two nodes. Then the XORed key is hashed and 
used to create a direct link between two nodes that are deployed in different generations. 
Compared to the RoK scheme, RGM has better resiliency because keys compromised 
from two nodes are only used in the generations that these nodes are deployed. Also, 
RGM has no limit on the deployment of the number of nodes to the network. However, 
increasing    value also increases the communication and computation cost of this 
scheme. 
 
2.5. Mobility Models 
WSNs are deployed randomly to different environments and they build an ad-hoc 
network of sensor nodes. Significant amount of the research in the literature is 
considering these nodes to be stationary. In real world, nodes are deployed to 
environments where natural forces may affect the position of the node. Usually, the 
communication network is expected to have the ability to adapt to modifications, such 
as movements caused by the dynamics in the nature [13]. One important thing to note 
here is that sensor nodes are assumed to be unaware of their position data and they 
cannot form a multi-hop routing table that can be used all the time. Therefore, every 
time a node wants to transmit information gathered from the environment, it is expected 
to search for other nodes to which there is a secure communication line exists. It is clear 
that if all nodes are moving, then WSNs are more likely affected by the mobility.  
In this study, we have used Random Walk Mobility (RWM), Reference Point Group 
Mobility (RPGM), and Circular Move Mobility (CMM) models while performing our 
analyses. RWM and RPGM mobility models have been used in the literature before and 
cited in some surveys [13], but CMM is newly proposed by our research group. 
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2.5.1. Random Walk Mobility Model 
In Random Walk Mobility Model (RWM), a mobile sensor node moves from its 
current location to a new location by randomly selecting a direction and speed from pre-
defined ranges, [                 ] and [    ] respectively. Each movement in 
this model occurs in a constant time interval  , at the end of which a new direction and 
speed values are calculated. When a node reaches the boundary of the environment that 
it is deployed, it bounces off the border with the reverse angle that it was moving from 
and continues to move in the area. The Random Walk Mobility Model is in “entity” 
mobility mode class in the literature because it considers each node independent of 
others [13]. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Movement pattern of a single node using Random Walk Mobility model 
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2.5.2. Reference Point Group Mobility Model 
In Reference Point Group Mobility Model (RPGM), sensor nodes move in groups and 
their movement is based upon the path traveled by a randomly selected logical center 
node. This center node moves according to an entity mobility model, which we have 
selected as the Random Walk Mobility Model in our study. Each node is assigned a 
reference point which follows the movements of the center node and they try to move 
within a pre-defined range around the center. Every node randomly moves from its 
current location to its next location based on its reference point. Therefore, RPGM 
model allows independent random motion behavior for each node that is performed 
inside the bounds of a group motion. The Reference Point Group Mobility Model is one 
of the widely used group mobility model because it is possible to choose different entity 
mobility models as the movement pattern of the logical center. 
 
Figure 2 - Movement pattern of a group with ten nodes using Reference Point Group 
Mobility model 
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2.5.3. Circular Move Mobility Model 
The Circular Move Mobility Model is another form that is in between entity and 
group mobility models. Sensor nodes are placed in the environment at 8 deployment 
locations in a circular border and they move to the center of the circle with randomly 
selected speed and direction from pre-defined ranges, [                 ] and 
[      ] respectively. Each movement in this model occurs in a constant time interval 
 , as in Random Walk Mobility model. However, nodes in this model are moving 
towards a smaller circular zone in the center of the area and this behavior forces the 
movement to be in groups; meaning closely deployed nodes will be neighbors with high 
probability.  
 
Figure 3 - Movement model of Circular Move Mobility model with sample sensor 
nodes 
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We depict a small sample movement model in Figure 3 using 24 sensor nodes 
deployed at 8 locations 3 nodes at a time. Directed lines show the movement direction 
and point to deployment locations on the border. We have assumed that there is a car 
moving on the border of the environment and stopping at these 8 pre-defined locations 
to deploy nodes. Since these nodes are deployed sequentially, they move to the center in 
spiral manner. Their movement pattern in the simulation environment is shown in 
Figure 4. As it can be observed from the movement pattern, nodes are covering the 
whole area with certain probability and they reach to every location on the environment 
while moving to the center of the area. 
 
Figure 4 - Movement pattern of Circular Move Mobility model in simulations 
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Besides combining entity and group mobility model features, Circular Move Mobility 
Model is an environmentally friendly mobility model. Sensor nodes end up at the 
circular area at the center of the environment when their batteries deplete. Therefore, in 
this mobility model, recycling dead nodes is much easier as compared to other models. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Our Proposal: A Key Predistribution Scheme Based on Hash 
Graphs 
 
This section describes our hash graph based key predistribution scheme proposal for 
mobile and multiphase wireless sensor networks. We provide the motivation behind this 
proposal; and we explain the key establishment phases along with an example to 
illustrate the procedure. 
 
3. 1. Overview 
Sensor nodes have very limited amount of energy reserve that limits their lifetime to a 
small period of time. Typically, this restricted lifetime of sensor nodes is very short 
compared to the lifespan of the network. Hence, new sensor nodes need to be deployed 
to the network in some intervals called generations. WSNs with multiple generations are 
called multiphase WSNs in the literature. We propose a hash graph based key 
predistribution scheme (HaG) for multiphase WSNs that uses different key pools, called 
generation key pool, for each generation of the network. Nodes in HaG scheme are 
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deployed with a single generation key ring. Using this generation key ring, nodes can 
establish secure channels and communicate with their neighbor nodes for multiple 
generations. 
In HaG scheme, key pool for a specific generation is constructed using key pools of 
previous generations. Two or more keys from previous generation are used to produce a 
key in a generation key pool. To some degree, nodes can use their key ring to generate 
keys in different key pools and use them for secure communication. Although there is a 
relation between key pools of different generations, this relation reduces in time in order 
to decrease attacker’s ability to intercept certain portions of the network communication. 
This relation between different key pools allows nodes to be able to establish secure 
channels with the nodes that are deployed in different generations. This feature allows 
HaG scheme to have better connectivity between sensor nodes; details of which will be 
discussed in performance evaluation section. 
The symbols and notations we use for our scheme in the rest of the thesis are listed in 
Table 2 below. 
Table 2 - List of symbols used in our scheme 
Symbol Definition 
  Key pool size 
     Maximum lifetime 
    Key pool at generation   
   
 
 Key ring of node   at generation   
  
 
 Key with index   at generation   
   
 
 Key group with index   at generation   
   
 
 Direct link key between nodes   and   for generation   
 ( ) 
Secure hash function 
   {   }  {   }    
 ( ) 
Hash function 
   {   }  {   }    
  Number of key ring groups that are drawn from key pool 
  Number of key groups in the key ring of a node 
  
Number of keys in the key ring of a node at the initial 
deployment time 
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In order to improve the resiliency against node capture attacks, we have employed the 
sensor node lifetime as an important parameter for our HaG scheme. Each sensor node 
has an upper bound of lifetime defined as      generations, which is referred as 
maximum lifetime. A node deployed at generation   will drain its battery before 
generation        reaches. A node that is deployed at generation   should be able to 
establish a secure channel with the nodes that are deployed between [         
    ] generation periods, in an ideal world. However, it has very low probability to find 
two sensor nodes whose deployment generation difference is close to     . Therefore, 
key rings of nodes are distributed in groups considering the deployment generation 
difference. This restricts the use of a particular key for specific generations and therefore 
improves the resiliency against node capture attacks. 
 
3. 2. Motivation and Scalability of the Scheme 
Main motivation behind our HaG scheme is to develop a key predistribution scheme 
for multiphase wireless sensor networks that has better resiliency against node capture 
attacks when compared to previously proposed schemes. Ergun et al. [3] have performed 
simulations to evaluate how much of the resiliency behavior of RoK scheme is 
attributable to backward and forward key pools. They have shown that backward key 
pool plays an important role in maintaining secure communication between sensor 
nodes. Their analysis also shows that the effect of the forward key pool to the security of 
the scheme remains constant after 5
th
 generation. This means that most of the nodes 
deployed at the beginning of the network are still alive when the security provided by the 
forward key pool becomes steady. This observation is the base of our HaG scheme 
because we use one key pool of backward hashed keys in forward direction to deliver 
security in WSNs. Instead of using forward and backward hash chains, as in RoK 
scheme, we use one key pool and evolve it in hash graph manner that simulates the 
backward key pool behavior in itself. This form of key pool generation makes sure that 
our proposal includes both forward and backward secrecy features. 
Furthermore, multiphase wireless sensor networks are deployed to environments in 
order to accomplish various tasks for a long period of time. Although network lifetime 
can be determined before starting the node deployment, this may not be the case for all 
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deployment scenarios. Therefore a key predistribution scheme should be able to adapt 
changes in the network and its lifetime. As we have mentioned before, RoK scheme uses 
one backward and one forward key pool. However, backward key pool of RoK scheme 
should be computed before starting the deployment phase and this makes it impossible to 
change the lifetime of the WSNs once it starts to operate. Therefore we can say that it is 
not possible to scale the WSNs lifetime if we are using RoK scheme. Conversely, HaG 
scheme starts functioning with one key pool and evolves its keys in time using an 
algorithm that we will be explaining in detail below. This feature makes it easy to scale 
the network lifetime and add more generations to the WSNs as desired.  The last 
generation key pool of the proposed scheme can be evolved using the same algorithm 
and this new key pool can be used for the nodes that are to be deployed in new 
generations. Therefore, HaG scheme does not have a lifetime scalability problem. 
 
3. 3. Key Establishment Phases 
There are three implementation procedures for our scheme: key pool generation, key 
ring predistribution and pairwise key establishment. The subsections below explain the 
details of these procedures. Figure 5 shows the generation key pools and depicts the key 
rings of two nodes. This figure is used in explaining the procedures and denoting the 
equations. We also give an example for key establishment phase using the nodes shown 
on Figure 5. 
 
3.3.1. Key Pool Generation 
Key pool of HaG scheme is updated at each generation. Unlike RoK scheme, we use 
only one key pool for generations and evolve them with different algorithm. The initial 
key pool has   randomly generated keys.  When the generation period ends, two 
consecutive keys are XORed and hashed with a secure hash function    {   }  
{   }   , such as SHA1 [14], to generate one key from key pool of the next generation. 
Generation key pool of the first generation is depicted in Figure 5, as the first row. 
More precisely, initial key pool of the network at generation 0 is defined as follows: 
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    {  
    
    
    
    
        
    
 } (10) 
where each   
  value is randomly generated. 
Key pool at generation   and     is denoted as follows: 
    {  
    
    
      
 } (11) 
      {  
      
      
        
   } (12) 
Keys in the generation    are generated by just performing a simple hash operation 
over two keys from the previous generation  . The relation between keys at different 
generations can be defined as: 
  
     (  
      
 ) (13) 
To reserve the key pool size   in every generation,   
   
 key is generated randomly 
and added to the end of       key pool. 
Generation key pools of the successive generations are shown in Figure 5 and they are 
marked with their generation number on left. Purpose of having some colored keys is 
explained in Section 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.2. Key Ring Predistribution 
In our scheme, we predistribute keys in groups of   keys from the generation key 
pool of size  . Each node has  keys that can be used to communicate with other nodes 
that are deployed to the environment at the same generation. Thus, nodes are loaded with 
    ⁄  different key groups from the key pool of their deployment generation. These 
key groups are selected using a pseudorandom function  ( ) which does not produce 
consecutive numbers for the same node. For example, the first key group of the node A 
deployed at generation   is  (       ) which contains keys in [ (       )  
   (       )  (   )[ interval. 
More precisely, key ring of node   is constructed as: 
   
  {   
     (       )            } (14) 
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And one of these key groups can be defined as: 
   
  {    
          
          
       (   )    
   } (15) 
Distribution of keys in groups allows nodes to have better chances of communication 
with nodes deployed in the future generations. As shown in Figure 5, a node can only 
update its key ring for a limited number of generations. We also make sure that our 
pseudorandom function  ( ) does not give two consecutive group numbers for the same 
node; because this will give the attacker the advantage to compromise keys for more 
generations, and eventually reduce the resiliency of the scheme faster. For the same 
reason, we suggest that the number of keys in groups,   value, should be determined 
close to      ⁄ ; based on the observations on age distribution of the nodes provided in 
RoK scheme [1]. 
One thing to note here is that a given node   can only update its key ring    
 
 for the 
generation   between   and    . This situation is shown in Figure 3 for two nodes. 
Since he will have at most   keys in groups and the  ( ) function does not give 
consecutive group numbers, node A cannot update its key ring    
 
 beyond generation 
   . This means that the lifetime of the key ring possessed by the node is limited. 
Therefore, an attacker that captures a node will only be able to use its compromised keys 
for a very limited period of time. As we will see later in performance analysis section, 
this is an important feature of HaG scheme that makes it more resilient against node 
capture attacks. 
By design, HaG scheme provides some security measures for the generation key 
pools. Security of the future generation key pool is provided by using two sequential 
keys to produce a key in the next generation. If an attacker captures a node, he will only 
be able to compromise keys for   generations. Security of past generation key pool is 
provided by the secure hash function  ( ). An attacker is not able to recover any of the 
past keys even he captures all of the alive nodes in the network. These security 
precautions increase the resiliency of the HaG scheme against node capture attacks. 
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Figure 5 - Key pool generation and pairwise key establishment in our scheme
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3.3.3. Pairwise Key Establishment 
Nodes start pairwise key establishment phase right after being deployed to the 
environment. When a sensor node A, with node identifier    , is deployed to the network 
at generation  , it broadcast a message containing these values. Neighbor nodes can use 
this message to construct list of indexes in the key ring    
 
 and using this key index list. 
Then using this list, they can check whether they have at least one common key or not. 
If node A is deployed at generation   and node B is deployed at generation   where 
   , then they can find a common key in [     [ generation interval. If they find at 
least one common key, then they XOR all common keys and then hash the result to 
generate     which is used to secure the communication between nodes A and B. Note 
that if A and B have the key indices            in common, then they both can compute 
the keys {  
                              } and use them for secure 
communication.  
Node A and B can then compute their secret key for generation   as follows: 
   
   (   
      
      
         
 ) (16) 
The key    
 
 can then be used to secure communication between sensor nodes A and 
B until the generation period   ends. When the generation period ends, nodes should 
immediately generate the keys of the succeeding generation and delete the keys from 
the past generation key pool. This improves the resiliency of the network deeply 
because nodes that are not yet captured by an attacker will not disclose as much key as 
they would, if they were to store the keys of the past generations. 
 
3.3.4. Key Establishment Example 
In this section, we provide an example for the pairwise key establishment protocol of 
HaG scheme. As seen in Figure 5, we have two nodes, A and B, that are deployed at 
generations   and     consecutively, with a maximum lifetime        and 
     ⁄   . Node A is deployed with the blue colored keys and node B is deployed 
with the yellow colored keys in their initial deployment generation. More formally, key 
rings of these nodes are as follows: 
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  {    
      
      
      
      
       
       
       
   } 
   
  {   
        
        
        
        
         
         
         
     } 
These key rings allow node A and B to communicate in     and     generations 
only, using the set of {  
        
         
         
      
         
   } keys. They cannot 
communicate in any other generation using these two key groups but this is just for 
illustration purposes. Formally, secret key between node A and B in generations      
and     can be defined as: 
   
     (  
        
         
         
   ) (17) 
   
     (  
         
   ) (18) 
When the generation     arrives, node A and B update their key rings. They should 
also immediately erase keys from the generation    , in order to increase the resiliency 
of the network. One other thing to note here is that node A can only communicate with 
the nodes deployed between generation   and    . Similarly, node B can only 
communicate with the nodes deployed between generation     and    . This 
limitation is because of the number of keys in groups,   value, and its relation is 
described above in Key Ring Predistribution section. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Performance Evaluation of HaG Scheme 
 
Performance analysis of the proposed HaG scheme is done by carrying out several 
simulations. We have considered different scenarios and mobility models in these 
simulations and compared our results with RoK scheme. We first describe the attack 
model and formulate the resiliency metrics. Then we explain the simulation setup and 
discuss performance results obtained. 
 
4. 1. Attack Model and Resiliency Metrics Formulation 
In this section, we are going to define attack models to WSNs and formulate our 
resiliency metrics. We use node capture attacks as the main threat in WSNs as in other 
studies in the literature such as [1-3, 5-10]. 
In the attack model, we assume that there is an attacker who has the ability to capture 
nodes at random locations from the environment. The rate at which this attacker 
captures nodes is defined as a system parameter and we have clearly indicated these 
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values in our simulations. When a node is captured by the attacker, all the keys 
possessed by that node are recorded in the memory of the attacker for further use in 
eavesdropping communications between other nodes. Because same keys can be reused 
during the course of the network by several nodes, attacker can use these captured keys 
to compromise the secure links between nodes that are not yet captured. Attacker uses 
captured keys and builds a hash graph of generation key pools as he continues to 
capture nodes. As we described before, our aim is to reduce the effect of node capture 
attacks on the security of the links between these unaware nodes and subsequently 
increase the resiliency against node capture attacks. 
We considered two different types of attackers: the eager and the temporary attackers. 
Both of these attackers start capturing nodes from 5th generation of the network. An 
eager attacker continuously compromise nodes at constant rate until the end of the 
network lifetime. This rate is defined as a system parameter and given in simulation 
results. Conversely, temporary attacker compromises nodes till 14th generation in our 
simulations. We have selected these generation parameters to be compatible with the 
simulations in RoK scheme [1].  
We then calculated, at each time interval, the number of compromised links in order 
to evaluate the resiliency performance against node capture attacks. This is the number 
of links that are secured using keys captured by the attacker; i.e. compromised links that 
can be eavesdropped. As it is clear from the description, if this number is low, then the 
employed key predistribution scheme is more resilient. 
In our simulations, we have used two resiliency metrics for evaluation: active 
resiliency and total resiliency. We have evaluated these metrics for both schemes, RoK 
and HaG, by performing simulation and discussed the results in Section 4.5. 
 
4.1.1. Active Resiliency 
Active Resiliency is the resiliency of currently active links against node capture 
attack. A communication link is said to be active when both nodes at its ends are still 
alive and they both continue collecting information from the environment. An attacker 
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that holds the encryption key of an active communication link can decrypt all the 
messages between communicating nodes. Active resiliency is measured as active 
compromised link ratio; defined as the ratio of the number of indirectly compromised 
active communication links over the total number of active communication links. 
Active resiliency performance of the network is better when this ratio is lower. 
 
4.1.2. Total Resiliency 
Total Resiliency is the resiliency of all links (established by active and dead nodes) 
against node capture attacks. It is measured as total compromised link ratio, which is the 
ratio of the number of indirectly compromised active and dead communication links 
that are formed from the beginning of the network over the total number of 
communication links that are formed from the beginning of the network. If the total 
compromised links ratio is lower, total resiliency performance of the network is better. 
This metric is important because attacker can record all the information transferred over 
the network even if he does not have the ability to decrypt the message. Later he can use 
all the keys that he gathered from the captured nodes and go over these messages to 
decrypt them. Therefore, Total Resiliency of the scheme is as important as the Active 
Resiliency in evaluating a key predistribution scheme.  
Although these metrics are called active and total resiliency, they both have an 
inverse relation to the active and total compromised links ratio. When these ratios are 
low, then the network’s resiliency is high. Therefore, this inverse relation should be 
kept in mind while evaluating the performance results. 
 
4.2. Analytical Formulations 
In this section, we describe analytical formulations o HaG performance metrics. In 
related literature, such as Basic [6], RoK [1] and RGM [2-3] schemes, performance 
metrics are formulated using some set theoretic rules and expressions. We also follow 
the same techniques in our formulations. We give formulations for both local 
connectivity and resiliency metric of HaG scheme.  
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We first formulate the key sharing probability of two neighboring nodes that are 
deployed at the same generation and define it as    . As we have described before, 
nodes will get their key rings from the same key pool if they are being deployed at the 
same generation. Assuming that the probability of sharing at least   keys is defined as 
  , we formulate this as: 
   
(
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(17) 
where  is the key ring size and   is the key pool size. 
Therefore, the probability that two nodes deployed at the same generation share at 
least one key is defined as     , which is: 
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(17) 
Then we formulate the probability that neighboring nodes share at least one key when 
they are deployed at different generations and define it as    . Using a set of   keys, a 
node can generate     keys in its future generations. Because nodes will update their 
key rings at each generation change and their keys will be deployed in groups of   keys, 
they will at most be able to generate     keys in their future generations. This is also 
dependent on the lifetime of the node, which will be described later. Therefore, 
probability formulation for the nodes deployed at different generations is: 
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(18) 
Considering these two equations, we need to find a threshold value for the 
connectivity of the network. We know that dead nodes are being replaced with new 
ones in the network when the generation period changes. Observing Equation 17 and 
18, we can see that     has   amount of effect in the total probability and     has   
34 
 
amount of effect on the probability. This will conclude that the probability of sharing at 
least one key is calculated as: 
                         (19) 
In Equation 19, nothing is dependent on the node density. The effect of node density 
is formulated in other schemes and we have employed their method for our calculations. 
Our resiliency calculation consider the probability that a link is compromised when a 
given set of nodes are captured by the attacker. However, gradual changes at the round 
level cannot be observed due to approximations and randomness of the proposed 
scheme. We have performed extensive simulations to provide resiliency analysis of the 
proposed scheme, but we believe that providing an approximate analytical formulation 
is supportive. 
Assuming that the average number of captured nodes at a given time is  , we know 
that the probability that a given key is not yet compromised is (  
 
 
)
 
. If a given link 
is secured by q keys, then the probability that this link is compromised is defined as 
(  (  
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. Therefore, the probability that an active link is compromised at 
generation   is defined as follows: 
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The  [ ] in this calculation uses   as the upper limit instead of the maximum 
lifetime value     . Therefore, the expected value of Z can be defined as: 
 
 [ ]   ∑   {   }
 
   
 
(21) 
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In Equation 20, nothing is dependent on the deployment generation because it will 
make the formulations much harder to define. We have left the final form to be 
independent of the deployment generation and therefore the results of these 
formulations will be constant. However, changes on the resiliency metric will be 
observable. We now give the analyses on simulations and then compare it with the 
analytical formulation results. 
 
4.3. Simulation Setup 
We perform several simulations and compare our scheme with RoK scheme. We 
have used C# programming language to implement the simulations and run them on 
Microsoft Windows 7 operating system environment. 
In these simulations, we set the key pool size to 10,000 keys for both schemes. We 
place sensor nodes to the environment in totally random manner to have more realistic 
simulations. We use 1,000 sensors on             square environment for 
simulations with Random Walk Mobility and Reference Point Group Mobility models. 
In simulations where Circular Move Mobility model is used, average number of nodes 
is around 1,200 and diameter of the environment is set to     . Since we are deploying 
25 nodes per round, number of sensor nodes in the environment fluctuates when we use 
Circular Move Mobility model. Communication range for nodes is set to     in both of 
these simulation environments.      is set to 10 and sensor nodes have a random 
lifetime that is determined using a Normal distribution function with mean      ⁄  and 
standard deviation      ⁄ . As explained before,   value is set to be 6 which is close to 
     ⁄ . We have also assumed that each generation consists of 10 smaller time units 
called rounds. Dead nodes are replaced with new randomly placed nodes at the 
beginning of each generation. 
Attack model that we have employed to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
scheme is described in Section 4. 1. above. Attacker’s capture rate is selected as one, 
three and five nodes per round. 
We run the simulations for 30 generations. Also, all of our simulations are run for 25 
times and we report their average values for the sake of smoothness in the results. 
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4.4. Network Connectivity 
We perform Global Connectivity and Local Connectivity analyses on both HaG and 
RoK schemes and compare their results using different mobility models. 
We base our analyses on the Local Connectivity of the network and select key ring 
sizes according to Local Connectivity metric. For that reason, simulations on 
connectivity analysis of RoK and HaG schemes are done using key ring sizes of 200, 220 
and 250 keys when nodes are moved using Random Walk Mobility and Reference Point 
Group Mobility models. For Circular Move Mobility model, we perform our simulations 
using 160, 205 and 265 keys. 
Global Connectivity of the network is the ratio of the largest key sharing graph over 
the size of the network. This metric is useful in understanding the overall connectivity of 
the network. With the specified key ring sizes, both RoK and our scheme have 100% 
Global Connectivity using Random Walk Mobility and Reference Point Group Mobility 
models. Therefore, we do not show the Global Connectivity performance of RoK and 
HaG scheme using these mobility models. However, when we use Circular Move 
Mobility model, then the Global Connectivity of HaG scheme becomes around 95%, 
whereas Global Connectivity of HaG scheme is around 98%. We compare Global 
Connectivity of HaG and RoK scheme in Figure 6. 
The difference between Global Connectivity results of RoK and HaG schemes is 
caused by the key ring size difference. In order to have same Local Connectivity value, 
we have selected the key ring sizes as 205 and 265 for HaG and RoK schemes 
respectively. But using lower number of keys in HaG ended up decreasing the Global 
Connectivity value as well. Besides, as seen in Figure 4, high density of the sensor nodes 
in the environment also affects the Global Connectivity results. Since we do not replace 
the dead nodes in the network, the graphs are a bit rugged in the Circular Move Mobility 
model. 
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Figure 6 - Global Connectivity of RoK and HaG scheme using Circular Move Mobility 
model (with same Local Connectivity) 
 
Local Connectivity is the probability that any two neighbor sensor nodes share at least 
one common key in their ring. This metric is especially important because it shows the 
probability of creating secure links between neighboring nodes. We have observed that 
using either Random Walk Mobility model or Reference Point Group Mobility model do 
not affect the Local Connectivity performance. Therefore, we treat them equally and 
show their performance in the same figure. Figure 7 shows the Local Connectivity values 
for both RoK and HaG schemes using 200, 220 and 250 keys as key ring sizes. As seen 
from this figure, nodes in both schemes have 0.8 Local Connectivity value when using 
220 keys for HaG scheme and 250 keys for RoK scheme. For a WSN, 80% Local 
Connectivity is sufficient for covering most of the network. Figure 7 also shows that for 
the same key ring sizes, Local Connectivity performance of HaG scheme is around 10% 
better than the RoK scheme. 
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Similarly, simulations are performed to evaluate the Local Connectivity performance 
of HaG and RoK scheme when Circular Move Mobility model is used. In this 
simulation, we employ different key ring sizes and came up with a point where Local 
Connectivity value is around 90%. Local Connectivity performance using Circular Move 
Mobility model is presented using 160, 205 and 265 keys as shown in Figure 8. Local 
Connectivity performance of HaG scheme is around 10% better than the performance of 
RoK scheme, when the key ring sizes are the same. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Local Connectivity of RoK and HaG scheme using Random Walk Mobility 
or Reference Point Group Mobility model 
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Figure 8 - Local Connectivity of RoK and HaG scheme using Circular Move Mobility 
model 
 
Since Random Walk Mobility and Reference Point Group Mobility models have the 
same Local and Global Connectivity performance, we continue to use Random Walk 
Mobility together with Circular Move Mobility model and drop Reference Point Group 
Mobility Model in our further evaluations. 
 
4.5. Resiliency against Node Capture Attacks 
Considering the Local Connectivity as the basis of our measures, we perform the 
resiliency analyses using Random Walk Mobility and Circular Move Mobility models. In 
our simulations, attacker actively captures 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round randomly and 
compromises all of the keys available in their memory. 
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4.5.1. Resiliency Performance using Random Walk Mobility  
In Random Walk Mobility model, key ring size is set to 220 for HaG scheme and 250 
for RoK scheme. These key ring sizes are selected according to the Local Connectivity 
performances, which is same for both schemes and around 0.8 as seen in Figure 7. Figure 
9 and 10 show the Active Resiliency and Total Resiliency comparison of RoK scheme 
and our HaG scheme using actual and total compromised links ratios; the lower the 
compromised links ratio, the better. 
Active compromised links ratio is calculated using nodes that are currently alive and 
has some keys compromised because attacker has captured some other nodes that are 
able to communicate. As it can be seen in Figure 9, active compromised links ratio 
reaches its highest value in around 10
th
 generation when most of the nodes that are 
deployed at the 5
th
 generation are still alive. After 10
th
 generation, nodes that are 
deployed at 5
th
 generation start to die in accordance with their lifetime determined using 
normal distribution. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Active Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with an eager 
attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Random Walk 
Mobility or Reference Point Group Mobility model) 
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Our results show that our scheme performs nearly 50% better when the attack rate is 
low, i.e. attacker captures one node per round. Although increasing attack rate negatively 
affects the performance of our scheme, our results are still better than RoK scheme. 
Total compromised links ratio is calculated by considering all dead (i.e. captured) or 
alive links that are established over the course of the network. Our simulations have 
shown that total resiliency of HaG scheme also outperforms the RoK scheme as it can be 
seen in Figure 10. Similar to the active resiliency, HaG scheme has nearly 50% better 
results when the attack rate is low. When the attack rate increases, HaG scheme still has 
lower total compromised links ratio compared to the RoK scheme. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Total  Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with an eager 
attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Random Walk 
Mobility or Reference Point Group Mobility model) 
 
Figure 11 shows the active compromised links ratio of HaG and RoK schemes in case 
of a temporary attacker starting its activity in generation 5 and ending in generation 14. 
The attacker starts capturing 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round and the compromised links ratio 
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increases to its highest value. After the attack stops, both networks start to heal, i.e. 
recover their initial state and eliminate the effects of the attack on the key pools. As it 
can be seen from the Figure 11, networks completely heal at almost the same time. 
However, our HaG scheme’s healing acceleration is higher than RoK; thus, HaG’s 
healing effect starts to improve resiliency at earlier generations as compared to RoK after 
the attack stops. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Active  Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with a 
temporary attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Random 
Walk Mobility or Reference Point Group Mobility model) 
 
4.5.2. Resiliency Performance using Circular Move Mobility 
When Circular Move Mobility model is used, key ring sizes are selected as 205 and 
265 for HaG and RoK schemes respectively. Using these key ring sizes, Local 
Connectivity performance of HaG and RoK scheme is around 0.9 as seen in Figure 8. 
Active compromised links ratio comparison of HaG and RoK scheme using Circular 
Move Mobility model in case of eager and temporary attackers is shown in Figure 12 
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and 13, respectively. Simulation results show that our scheme performs nearly 40% 
better when the attack rate is low, i.e. attacker captures one node per round. However, 
the effect of increasing attack rate is not that sharp when compared to the performance of 
other mobility models. In fact, there is a considerable amount of gap between the 
resiliency performances of HaG and RoK even if the attack rate is increased to five 
nodes per round. The reason behind this difference is the difference between key ring 
sizes. We use the same key pool size for both schemes but HaG has considerable amount 
of reduced key ring size. However, they both have the same Local Connectivity values in 
the analysis as mentioned above. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Active Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with an eager 
attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Circular Move 
Mobility model) 
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Figure 13 - Active Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with a 
temporary attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Circular 
Move Mobility model) 
 
Total compromised links ratio comparison of HaG and RoK scheme using Circular 
Move Mobility model is shown in Figure 14. Our simulations show that total resiliency 
of HaG scheme also outperforms the RoK scheme. Similar to the active resiliency, HaG 
scheme performs nearly 40% better when the attack rate is low. When the attack rate 
increases, HaG scheme still has lower total compromised links ratio compared to the 
RoK scheme and the difference between these schemes is much clearer than that of 
Random Walk Mobility case. 
 
4.6. Comparison of Analytical Formulations and Simulation Performance 
In this section, we compare the simulation results of HaG scheme with the result of 
the corresponding analytical formulations. The reason of making such comparison is to 
validate our simulations. As sample cases from connectivity and resiliency analyses, we 
have considered local connectivity and active compromised links ratio metrics. 
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Figure 14 - Total  Compromised Links Ratio of RoK and HaG schemes with a 
temporary attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (using Circular 
Move Mobility model) 
 
Figure 15 and 16 show the comparison of simulation results of local connectivity with 
the analytical formulation given in Equation 19. As seen in these figures, analytical 
results and the corresponding simulation results are the same. We have used two 
different graphs to show the local connectivity comparison because node densities in 
different mobility models are not the same. Essentially, we have two different 
environments for Random Walk Mobility model and Circular Move Mobility model. As 
we discuss in analytical formulations section, this difference in node densities affects the 
local connectivity performance. 
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Figure 15 - Local Connectivity comparison of HaG Scheme: simulation vs. analytical 
(using Random Walk Mobility Model or Reference Point Group Mobility model). 
 
 
Figure 16 - Local Connectivity comparison of HaG Scheme: simulation vs. analytical 
(using Circular Move Mobility Model). 
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Figure 17 and 18 show the comparison of simulation results of active compromised 
links ratio with the analytical formulation given in Equation 14. As seen in these figures, 
analytical results go over a line that averages the corresponding simulation results. The 
reason of having a straight line and not having zigzags in the analytical case is that we do 
not consider rounds in our formulations. 
These observations clearly verify our simulation results and the correctness of our 
simulation environment.  
 
 
Figure 17 - Active Compromised Links Ratio comparison of HaG Scheme with an eager 
attacker having capture rates of 3 and 5 nodes per round: simulation vs. analytical 
(using Random Walk Mobility Model or Reference Point Group Mobility Model). 
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Figure 18 - Active Compromised Links Ratio comparison of HaG Scheme with an eager 
attacker having capture rates of 3 and 5 nodes per round: simulation vs. analytical 
(using Circular Move Mobility Model). 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this thesis, we propose a new key predistribution scheme that is designed for 
multiphase wireless sensor networks. Our scheme starts with an initial set of random key 
pool that evolves over time, in a graph fashion, to generate key pools for the subsequent 
generations. Sensors deployed at different generations start with a key ring that is 
randomly selected from the key pool of their deployment generation in groups. 
Deploying keys in groups increases connectivity and decreases resiliency. An attacker 
capturing a node can only compromise keys for generations bounded by the key group 
size. 
We have performed simulations on different mobility models and discussed their 
performance results. Our simulations have shown that after fixing the local connectivity 
value to the same value for both our scheme and RoK scheme using both Random Walk 
and Circular Move mobility model, resiliency performance of our scheme is 50% better 
when the attack rate is small. When the attack rate increases, our scheme still performs 
better as compared to RoK scheme but relative benefit decrease to %10. Our analysis has 
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shown that Circular Move mobility model gives better results for our proposal than 
Random Walk Mobility and Reference Point Group Mobility models. 
Our broad analyses on both active and total resiliency metrics have shown that our 
HaG scheme has better resiliency performance than the RoK scheme at all capture rates. 
HaG scheme increases the resiliency performance by 50% when the attack rate is low. 
When the attack rate increases; resiliency performance increases by 10% and 30% for 
Random Walk Mobility and Circular Move Mobility models respectively. 
Finally, we discuss some future works that can be done on top of HaG scheme in 
order to further improve resiliency performance. We have simply used two consecutive 
keys to update the generation key pools in HaG, but one could use multiple keys or even 
different methods to update the key pools. Using multiple keys to update a key to the 
next generation would increase resiliency against node capture attacks. Instead of using 
just one hash graph to distribute key rings to sensor nodes, one could use multiple hash 
graphs and increase the resiliency. Similarly, one could use one forward and one 
backward hash graph and update them as in RoK scheme. This would decrease the 
connectivity of the network drastically, but its effect on the resiliency is worth 
analyzing. For that matter, usage of multiple forward and backward hash graphs may as 
well have better resiliency performance.  
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